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Casenotes and Statute Notes
TORTS - PRODUCT LIABILITY - Consumers may not recover
purely economic losses in Illinois strict product liability ac-
tions. Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91
Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d (1982).
In 1966, National Tank Company manufactured and sold a
500,000 bushel, bolted-steel, grain storage tank' to Moorman
Manufacturing Company for use at its feed. processing plant
in Alpha, Illinois.2 By early 1977, a crack had developed in
one of the steel plates on the second ring of the tank.' The
plaintiff, who was the purchaser of the grain storage tank,
filed suit against the manufacturer alleging that the tank was
not reasonably safe due to certain design and manufacturing
defects,4 that the defendant had made misrepresentations in
the sale of the tank,' and that the defendant had negligently
designed the tank.' The plaintiff prayed for damages repre-
senting both the loss of use and cost of repairs and reinforce-
ment of the tank. The trial court specifically held that the
plaintiff could not recover for purely economic losses under
strict tort liability and the other tort theories advanced by the
plaintiffs and that the damages sought were economic losses
I Reply Brief for Appellant at 1, Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 92 Ill.
App. 3d 136, 414 N.E.2d 1302 (1S1).
Id. at 7.
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 92 I1. App. 3d 136, 414 N.E.2d 1302,
1304 (1981).
4 414 N.E.2d at 1304. Count I was based on strict liability. Id.
5 d. Count II was based on misrepresentation. Id.
6 Id. Count III was based on negligence. d. A fourth count sounding in contract
claimed that the plaintiff had relied upon an express warranty made by the defen-
dant at the time of the sale. Id.
7Id.
' See supra notes 4-6.
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only.' Reversing the trial court, the appellate court held that
the plaintiff could recover for economic losses under the tort
theories of strict liability, misrepresentation, and negligence. 10
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the defendant,
National Tank Company, argued that none of the policy rea-
sons supporting strict liability11 or other tort doctrines would
be furthered by expanding the doctrine to encompass cases
involving only economic losses and that such an extension
would undermine the statutory law of sales in Illinois 2 and
the principle of freedom of contract." Held, reversed: Con-
sumers may not recover purely economic losses in Illinois
strict product liability actions. Moorman Manufacturing Co.
v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d. 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
I. THE EARLY CASES
The question of whether a consumer can recover under a
strict liability in tort theory for solely economic 1oss14 was first
1 414 N.E.2d at 1304. The trial court refused to dismiss Count IV, which alleged an
express warranty, because it found that such a warranty existed and extended to fu-
ture performances of the tank. Id.
1* Id. at 1305. The appeals court answered "no" to the question presented by the
trial court's refusal to dismiss Count IV in express warranty on the basis of the stat-
ute of limitations:
Does the following express warranty "explicitly extend to future per-
formance" within the meaning of § 2-725(2) of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code . . .so as to toll the otherwise long-since-run four (4) year
Statute of Limitations of 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code... :
"Tank designed to withstand 60 pounds per bushel grain and 100
m.p.h. winds"?
Id. at 1315.
" The policy reasons as defined in the National Tank Company's Brief are: (1)
safeguarding public safety and health, (2) enhancing the manufacturer's incentive to
produce safe products, and (3) imposing the loss on the one creating the risk and
reaping the profit. Reply Brief for Appellant at 2-4, Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National
Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
" The Illinois Legislature enacted the sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26 §§ 2-101 to 2-725 (1973).
" Reply Brief for Appellant at 1-13, Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91
Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
11 "Economic loss" has been defined variously as: (1) "damages for inadequate
value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss of
profits - without any claim of personal injury or damage to other property". Note,
Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 918
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Note, Economic Loss] (2) "the diminution in the value of
CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
addressed by a court in Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian,
Inc.,15 in which the plaintiff purchased carpeting manufac-
tured by the defendant from a third-party seller.'6 After sev-
eral months, unsightly lines began to appear on the surface of
the carpet.' The trial court determined that there was an im-
plied warranty of merchantability and concluded that the de-
fendant breached that warranty. 8 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey affirmed and held that the plaintiff could maintain a
breach of implied warranty claim directly against the manu-
facturer despite the lack of privity between them.' 9 In dicta,
the court stated that the plaintiff also possessed a cause of
action in strict tort liability.2 0 As with cases involving personal
and property injuries caused by defective products, the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey held that a manufacturer of an
unsatisfactory product is better able to insure against and to
spread the risk of economic losses than are individual con-
sumers. The court observed:
[W]hen the manufacturer presents his goods to the public for
sale he accompanies them with a representation that they are
suitable and safe for the intended use .... The obligation of
the manufacturer thus becomes what in justice it ought to be -
- an enterprise liability, and one which should not depend
upon the intricacies of the law of sales. The purpose of such
liability is to insure that the cost of injuries or damage, either
to the goods sold or to other property, resulting from defective
products, is borne by the makers of the products who put them
in the channels of trade, rather than by the injured or damaged
persons who ordinarily are powerless to protect themselves. 2' .
Thus, the New Jersey court imposed an implied representa-
the product because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general pur-
poses for which it was manufactured and sold." Comment, Manufacturer's Liability
to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss" Damages - Tort or Contract?, 114 U.
PA. L. REv. 539, 541 (1966).
16 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
'6 207 A.2d at 307.
17 Id.
I8 /d.
' Id. at 310.
20 Id. at 311-13.
1 Id. at 311-12.
1983]
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tion of quality even in the absence of an actual representation
by the manufacturer.2 2 According to Santor, if an article is
defective23 in design or manufacture, or if the defect arose
while under the manufacturer's control, and the defect proxi-
mately caused damage to the ultimate purchaser or reasona-
bly expected consumer, liability exists whether the damages
are personal injuries, injuries to other property of the con-
sumer, or damage to the article sold.24
Several months after Santor, in Seely v. White Motor Co.,2 5
the Supreme Court of California, in dicta, rejected the exten-
sion of strict liability as embodied in Santor2 6 In Seely, the
plaintiff sued the defendant manufacturer to recover for dam-
ages sustained by one of its trucks when it overturned as a
result of defective brakes.2 7 Although no damages for personal
injury were alleged,28 plaintiff sought to recover damages for
the purchase price of the truck, the repair of the truck after
the accident, and profits lost from deprivation of the normal
use of the truck resulting from the accident.2 9 The court held
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover on the basis of the
express warranty existing between the parties.30 The court, in
dicta, examined the relationship between warranty or contract
theory and strict liability tort theory. The court rejected strict
liability on the ground that economic loss involves the failure
of the product to perform to the level of the party's expecta-
tions, a concept grounded essentially in the law of contracts,
not the law of torts. 1 With regard to the relationship between
22 Iote, Economic Loss, supra note 14, at 937.
23 The court defined "defective" as being "not reasonably fit for the ordinary pur-
poses for which such articles are sold and used." Santor, 207 A.2d at 313.
Id. at 312-13.
63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
27 Id. at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
Id. at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
29 Id. at 147-48, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
Id. at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
"Id. at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. See also Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981) (discussing the difference in tort and
contract theories); Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Pre-
empted by the U.C.C. and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REv. 123, 127
(1974).
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contract and tort law, Chief Justice Traynor, writing for the
court, stated:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery
for physical injuries and warranty recovery for eonomic loss is
not arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" of one plaintiff in
having an accident causing physical injury. The distinction
rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the respon-
sibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his
products. He can appropriately be held liable for physical inju-
ries caused by defects by requiring his goods to match a stan-
dard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create unrea-
sonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the level of
performance of his products in the consumer's business unless
he agrees that the product was designed to meet the con-
sumer's demands. A consumer should not be charged at the
will of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical in-
jury when he buys a product on the market. He can, however,
be fairly charged with the risk that the product will not match
his economic expectations unless the manufacturer agrees that
it will. Even in actions for negligence, a manufacturer's liability
is limited to damages for physical injuries and there is no re-
covery for economic loss alone.32
Critical of the decision in Santor, the Seely court noted
that "[o]nly if someone had been injured because the rug was
unsafe for use would there have been any basis for imposing
strict liability in tort"."3 Pointing out that strict tort liability
was developed to deal with the problem of physical injuries
caused by defective products, the court reasoned that war-
ranty doctrines, developed to meet the needs of commercial
transactions, 4 function well when solely economic loss is suf-
fered." The court, in reaching this decision, expressed con-
cern with the potentially broad base of liability facing the
manufacturer if strict liability for economic loss were im-
' 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
33 Id.
Id. at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,
59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
.. 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
19831
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posed.36 While strict liability for physical injuries is restricted
to "conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm," 7 the
creation of non-disclaimable liability for failure of the product
to function as the purchaser expected would subject the man-
ufacturer to liability "for damages of unknown and unlimited
scope."3 " The court noted that the policy placing the burden
of the risk of physical injury on the manufacturer who can
distribute it among the consuming public "in no way justifies
requiring the consuming public to pay more for their products
so that a manufacturer can insure against the possibility that
some of his products will not meet the business needs of his
customers."39
In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Seely," Justice
Peters disagreed with the majority's approach to economic
loss in strict liability.4 1 He argued that there were no public
policy reasons requiring a distinction between physical injury
and economic loss 42 and cited with approval the Santor
Court's refusal to limit the strict liability doctrine to personal
injury claims.' 3 Justice Peters argued that the distinction be-
tween physical injury and economic loss in the application of
strict liability makes sense only if "protection of life and limb
is of greater social value than protection against financial
loss,"" and then, only if strict liability acts as a deterrent,
thus inducing manufacturers to be more careful in their pro-
duction methods.'" In Justice Peters' opinion, if a manufac-
turer is not moved to caution in production by the prospect of
negligence liability, res ipsa loquitur, 4 and the effect of a de-
36 Id. at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22. See also Note, Economic Loss, supra note 14, at
939.
" 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
,81 Id. at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
31 Id. at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
40 Id. at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
41 Id.
"4 Id. at 153, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 154, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
45 Id.
41 "The thing speaks for itself." Res ipsa loquitur is a rebuttable presumption or
inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that the instrumen-
tality causing the injury was in the defendant's exclusive control, and that the acci-
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fective product upon his business reputation, that manufac-
turer will be unmoved by the relatively slight increase in pos-
sible liability resulting from the application of strict liability
for physical injuries.4 Thus, in Justice Peters' view, it is high-
ly unlikely that the imposition of strict liability furnishes a
deterrent. 48 Rather, the purpose of strict liability is "to insure
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are
borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves. ' 4 This purpose, according to Justice Pe-
ters, appropriately supports economic loss cases as well as ac-
tions for personal injury or property damage.80
Furthermore, Justice Peters argued that creation of strict
liability for economic loss would not subject the manufacturer
dent was one which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence. See
Hillen v. Hooker Const. Co., 484 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no
writ). Under the doctrine, the happening of an injury permits an inference of negli-
gence where the plaintiff produces substantial evidence that the injury was caused by
an agency or instrumentality under the exclusive control and management of the de-
fendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would
not happen if reasonable care had been used. Id.
4 403 P.2d at 154-55, 45 Cal. Rptr. 26-27.
Id. at 155, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 27. Justice Peters quotes Prosser with approval:
A skeptic may well question whether the callous manufacturer, who is
unmoved by the prospect of negligence liability, plus res ipsa loquitur,
and by the effect of any injury whatever upon the reputation of his
goods, will really be stimulated by the relatively slight increase in pos-
sible liability to take additional precautions against defects which can-
not be prevented by only reasonable care.
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1119 (1960).
1" 403 P.2d at 155, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 27 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963)).
50 Id. Justice Peters disagreed with the majority's reasoning which requires the
manufacturer to bear the risk of personal injury damages because the cost of an in-
jury and the loss of time and health might be an overwhelming misfortune. He
pointed out that an economic loss might be an equally overwhelming misfortune:
Suppose, for example, defective house paint is sold to two homeown-
ers. One suffers temporary illness from noxious fumes, while the
other's house is destroyed by rot because the paint proved ineffective
(a loss generally uninsured). Although the latter buyer may clearly suf-
fer the greater misfortune, the majority would not let him recover
under the strict liability doctrine because his loss is solely "economic,"
while letting the first buyer recover the minimal costs and lost earn-
ings caused by his illness.
Id. at 155-56, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28.
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to liability for unlimited damages.'1 If "defective" within the
meaning of the strict tort rule were to be defined as "un-
merchantable,"5' Justice Peters insisted, a well-defined stan-
dard could be imposed." Also, a manufacturer would still be
allowed to sell his product "as is.""' As a result, if the pur-
chaser were to buy with knowledge of the "as is" description,
he would be barred from obtaining relief for economic loss in
strict liability by the doctrine of assumption of risk."
II. CASES IN JURISDICTIONS FOLLOWING SEELY
Following the lines of separation between Santor and Seely,
courts in this country have divided over whether an action
may be maintained in tort against a manufacturer for recov-
ery of ecomonic losses unaccompanied by personal injury or
damage to other property. A large majority of courts, follow-
ing the Seely approach, have held that pure economic losses
are not recoverable under claims sounding in strict tort liabil-
ity.' 6 A strong minority of jurisdictions, however, have fol-
11 403 P.2d at 156, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
52 U.C.C. § 2-324(2) (1979) provides:
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and
(b) in the case of fungible goods are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality, and quantity within each unit and among all units in-
volved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
403 P.2d at 156, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) (1979) provides: "[U]nless the circumstances indicate other-
wise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults"
or other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the
exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty . .. .
" 403 P.2d at 158, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 30. The doctrine of assumption of the risk, also
known as volenti non fit injuria, provides that a plaintiff may not recover for an
injury to which he assents; in other words, a person may not recover for an injury
when he voluntarily exposes himself to a known and appreciated danger. See, e.g.,
Clarke v. Brockway Motor Trucks, 372 F. Supp. 1342, 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
" See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d
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lowed or expressly adopted the permissive, Santor decision. 7
After the landmark cases of Santor and Seely, one of the
first courts to grapple with the problem of pure economic loss
recovery in strict liability was the Supreme Court of Oregon in
Price v. Gatlin.58 In an action for damages for economic loss
resulting from the defective manufacture of a tractor, the
court, which had previously imposed strict tort liability on the
manufacturers of products causing personal injury,5' refused
to extend that doctrine to include the defendant wholesaler in
280 (3d Cir. 1980) (predicting Illinois law); Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976) (Pennsylvania law); Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v.
R.C.A. Corp., 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973) (Texas law); Southwest Forest Industries,
Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 902 (1970) (Pennsylvania law); Midland Forge Inc. v. Letts Industries, Inc., 395
F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 391 F. Supp.
962 (D. Ariz. 1975), aff'd, 41 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1976) (under law of Arizona, Califor-
nia, Hawaii, Texas, or Alaska economic loss is not recoverable in strict liability ac-
tion); Cooley v. Salopian Industries, Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 1114 (D.S.C. 1974); Noel
Transfer & Package Delivery Services v. General Motors Corp., 341 F. Supp 968 (D.
Minn. 1972); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976);
Beauchamp v. Wilson, 21 Ariz. App. 14, 515 P.2d 41 (1973); Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes
Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 442, 102 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1972); Hiigel v. General Motors Corp.,
190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975); Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 I11.
App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977); Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co.,
72 Ill. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1966); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp.,
311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981); Hawkins Construction Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb.
546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973); Price v. Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); Nobil-
ity Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977). For commentary ap-
proving the Seely position, see Keeton, Torts, 23 Sw. L.J. 1 (1969); Prosser, The Fall
of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1969); Comment, Manufacturer's Responsibil-
ity for Defective Products: Continuing Controversy Over the Law to be Applied, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1681 (1966); Note, Manufacturer's Liability to Remote Purchaser for
"Economic Loss" Damages - Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539 (1969).
57 E.g., Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio
1979); Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800
(1970); Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975);
City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124
(1976). For commentary in agreement with the Santor opinion, see Comment, Prod-
ucts Liability: Expanding the Property Damage Exception in Pure Economic Loss
Cases 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963 (1978); Comment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely
Economic Loss in Products Liability: An Injury in Search of A Remedy, 4 SETON
HALL 145 (1972); Note, Economic Loss, supra note 14; Note, Manufacturer's Strict
Tort Liability to Consumers for Economic Loss, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 401 (1967).
", 405 P.2d 502 (Or. 1965).
I' Wrights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 405 P.2d 624 (Or. 1965) cited in Price v. Gatlin,
405 P.2d at 503.
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a suit for economic loss.6 0 The court, citing Seely, stated that
"the social and economic reasons which courts elsewhere have
given for extending enterprise liability to the victims of physi-
cal injury are not equally persuasive in a case of a disap-
pointed buyer of personal property."'"
More recently, the Supreme Court of Oregon refined its rul-
ing regarding the recovery of economic loss in Russell v. Ford
Motor Co. 62 The court drew a distinction between products
which simply do not live up to their economic expectations
and those which, although they did not break down in a man-
ner which proved hazardous to persons or other property,
could foreseeably have done so. 3 The court reasoned:
Insofar as the premise of responsibility for the marketing of a
dangerously defective product states a norm for the producer
and seller, the norm either has or has not been met at the time
the product is sold. Whether the seller has met this responsi-
bility cannot depend on the fortuitous extent of the damage
done when the danger created by the defect subsequently
comes to pass ....
[T]his does not imply that once a product is dangerously de-
fective its seller is liable for any and all losses consequent upon
its use . . . .The loss must be a consequence of the kind of
danger and occur under the kind of circumstances, "acciden-
tal" or not, that made the condition of the product a basis for
the strict liability. This distinguishes such a loss from eco-
nomic loss due only to the poor performance or the reduced
resale value of a defective, even a dangerously defective, prod-
uct. It is the distinction between the disappointed users ...
and the endangered ones .... 64
Cited with approval in another jurisdiction," this "degree of
danger test" formulated by the Oregon Court has been re-
ceived with approval in a recent commentary.6
60 405 P.2d at 503.
61 Id.
" 575 P.2d 1383 (Or. 1978).
63 Id.
" Id. at 1386-87.
65 Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska
1981).
Comment, Oregon Adopts the Degree of Danger Test for Strict Liability - The
1983] CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
The Supreme Court of Alaska has also adopted the distinc-
tion between economic loss caused by commercial disappoint-
ment in a defective product's performance and economic loss
caused by damage to the product itself resulting from a dan-
gerous defect. In Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc.,7 the
plaintiff sued a mobile home manufacturer for damages re-
sulting from various defects in the product including a defec-
tive furnace, cracked windows, a leaky bathroom, and a leaky
roof.68 The court denied recovery stating that strict liability in
tort does not extend to the consumer who suffers only eco-
nomic loss.69 Permitting strict liability in tort for purely eco-
nomic loss, in the court's view, would have jeopardized rights
granted the manufacturer under the Uniform Commercial
Code and would be contrary to legislative intent.70
One year later, the court again considered a case involving a
mobile home which had been defectively manufactured. In
Cloud v. Kit Manufacturing Co.,7 1 the court clarified its opin-
ion in Morrow. Plaintiffs claimed that a polyurethane foam
rug padding, which was part of their mobile home package,
Implied Warranty Alternative, 58 OR. L. REV. 545 (1980). Another author calls the
recovery in strict liability for damage to the product only, which occurs in a violent
way, "the property damage exception." Comment, Products Liability: Expanding the
Property Damage Exception in Pure Economic Loss Cases, 54 CHI-KENT L. REV. 963,
965 (1978). The dangerous/nondangerous distinction has been criticized as unfounded
in theory and unworkable in practice. Ribstein, Guidelines for Deciding Product Eco-
nomic Loss Cases, 29 MERCER L. REV. 493, 500-01 (1978).
07 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
Id. at 281-82.
19 Id. at 286.
70 Id. The court stated:
The economically injured consumer would have a theory of redress not
envisioned by our legislature when it enacted the U.C.C. since this
strict liability remedy would be completely unrestrained by disclaimer,
liability limitation and notice provisions. Further, manufacturers could
no longer look to the Uniform Commercial Code provisions to provide
a predictable definition of potential liability for direct economic loss.
In short, adoption of the doctrine of strict liability for economic loss
would be contrary to the legislature's intent when it authorized the
aforementioned remedy limitations and risk allocation provisions of
Article II of the Code. To extend strict tort liability to reach the Mor-
row's case would in effect be an assumption of legislative prerogative
on our part and would vitiate clearly articulated statutory rights.
Id.
71 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977).
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ignited, causing the mobile home to catch fire and burn. 2
Concluding that the resulting injury constituted property
damage, which was recoverable in strict liability, rather than
economic loss which was not recoverable (as in Morrow), the
court stated:
We recognize that the line between economic loss and direct
property damage is not always easy to discern, particularly
when the plaintiff is seeking compensation for the loss of the
product itself. We cannot lay down an all inclusive rule to dis-
tinguish between the two categories; however, we note that
sudden and calamitous damage will almost always result in di-
rect property damage and that deterioration, internal breakage
and depreciation will be considered economic loss. 3
A further refinement of this "degree of danger" distinction
between property damage and economic loss was required by
the Alaska court in Northern Power & Engineering Corp. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co.7 4 The Supreme Court of Alaska indi-
cated that the difference between a dangerously defective
product and a non-dangerous product was at the heart of the
Cloud distinction between property damage and economic
loss. 7 5 The court therefore held that when a defective product
creates a situation potentially dangerous to persons or other
property and loss occurs as a result of that danger, strict lia-
bility in tort is an appropriate theory of recovery "even
though the damage is confined to the product itself. ' '1 6 In or-
der to recover on such a theory the plaintiff must show: (1)
that the loss was a proximate result of the dangerous defect
and (2) that the loss occurred under dangerous circum-
stances.7 The plaintiff in Northern Power failed to show that
the damage to an engine resulting from a defective low oil
pressure shutdown mechanism presented such a danger to
persons or other property.78 In this case, the engine appar-
72 Id.
73 Id. at 251.
74 623 P.2d at 324 (Alaska 1981).
71 Id. at 329.
70 Id.
77 Idl.
70 The low oil pressure shutoff mechanism was not considered by the court to be a
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ently just stopped operating. 79 Therefore, under its guidelines,
the Alaska court determined that the plaintiff's loss was en-
tirely economic and not recoverable under strict product
liability.80
In Pennsylvania, the supreme court has yet to expressly
consider the rule of strict liability as it applies to cases of eco-
nomic loss in the absence of personal injury or injury to other
property. However, that court's dicta in Kassab v. Central
Soya"1 has been cited by several courts as an indication of
how the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would rule were it
faced with the issue. 2 In Kassab, plaintiffs were raisers of
breeding cattle whose value was greatly diminished when they
ate contaminated feed manufactured by the defendant.8 3 Con-
fronted with the question of whether to eliminate the privity
requirement in contract in suits by purchasers against remote
manufacturers for breach of implied warranty,84 the court
held that privity of contract was no longer a prerequisite to
recovery in contract.85 In reaching this result the court ac-
knowledged that the tort doctrine of products liability ex-
pressed in section 402A of the Restatement of Torts" would
component part which due to defect damaged another component part, the engine, so
as to result in damage to "other" property of the plaintiff. Id. at 330.
19 Id. at 329.
80 Id. at 330. The court noted that its reasoning in Morrow to allow recovery in tort
for purely economic loss would jeopardize rights granted to a manufacturer under the
U.C.C. and undermine legislative policy. Id. at 327 n.3. See supra note 70. The court
pointed out that the line should be drawn and recovery allowed in strict liability
when the product is dangerous. 623 P.2d at 328.
" 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
82 Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1167-
68 (3d Cir. 1981); Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d
193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973) (applying Pennsylvania law).
83 246 A.2d at 849.
Id. at 848.
" Id. at 854.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to lia-
bility for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and
(b) it is expected to reach the user or consumer without sub-
19831
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permit recovery for damage to plaintiffs' cattle business.8
Furthermore, the court observed that the language of the Re-
statement appeared broad enough to cover any harm that
could befall the purchaser of a defective product."8 Using the
example of an exploding gas stove, the court opined that
under section 402A a plaintiff could recover the cost of repair-
ing or replacing the stove. 9 Noting that replacement costs for
the defective product itself are sometimes referred to as eco-
nomic loss, the court stated that there "would seem to be no
reason for excluding this measure of damages in an action
brought under the Restatement, since the defective product
itself is as much 'property' as any other possession of the
plaintiff that is damaged as a result of the manufacturing
flaw." 90
Predicting Pennsylvania law regarding economic loss, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court applied a literal interpretation of
the dicta in Kassab in Air Products and Chemical, Inc. v.
Fairbanks Morse, Inc." The court allowed recovery in strict
liability for damages sustained when a defect in a motor,
which was "unreasonably dangerous to those parts or portions
of the motor which did not contain the defect,"" caused the
motor to malfunction." In a more recent decision, Pennsylva-
nia Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,94 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Kassab5 to allow recov-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
:7 432 A.2d at 854.
Id. at 854 n.7.
Id. at 854-55 n.7.
Id. at 855 n.7.
58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
9' Id. at 417.
Id. at 416.
4 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981).
91 The court also relied on the reasoning of: Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248
(Alaska 1977); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965); Cornell Drilling Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 241 Pa. Super 129, 359 A.2d 822
(1976); MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969).
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ery in strict liability for damages to a defective front-end
loader incurred as a result of a fire.90 In a footnote, however,
the court stated that the example in Kassab concerning the
exploding stove showed a concern with hazardous products.9
Therefore, it reasoned, the dicta in Kassab was "not ad-
dressed to the considerations present when the defect is
merely one of quality or suitability."9 " The court applied the
"degree of danger" test to categorize the damage done as
physical injury to property, allowed in strict liability because
it was caused by a hazardous defect, rather than economic
loss."
Other jurisdictions have refused to apply a "degree of dan-
ger" distinction0 " in economic loss cases and have refused to
allow recovery of economic loss at all in strict tort liability.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Hawkins Construction
Co. v. Matthews Co.,101 refused to extend strict tort liability to
situations in which the loss involved injury to the defective
product itself even though the case involved the collapse of
defective scaffolding in which a worker "miraculously escaped
with only minor injuries. "102 The Nebraska court's action can
be explained in terms of its unique version of strict liability.
Nebraska recognizes strict liability only for an "injury to a
human being rightfully using that product.' ' 0 3 Thus, under
Nebraska law, any damage to property, whether to the prod-
uct itself or to other property of the claimant, would be char-
acterized as economic loss and disallowed by the Nebraska
court.104
" A fire suddenly broke out in the front portion of the loader near the hydraulic
line. 652 F.2d at 1166. The operator left the machine without turning off the motor.
Id. Consequently, hydraulic fluid continued to fuel the fire and the loader was se-
verely damaged. Id. The loader did not come equipped with a system to suppress or
extinguish fires, and there were no operating instructions concerning fire hazards. Id.
I1 d. at 1173 n.23.
98 Id.
99 See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
300 Id.
303 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
301 209 N.W.2d at 648.
303 I. at 652.
104 Mid Continent Aircraft v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308,
319 (Tex. 1978) (Pope, J., dissenting).
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In Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers,'05 the Supreme
Court of Texas was faced with the question of whether the
remote manufacturer of a mobile home could be held liable
under strict liability for the economic loss his product caused
a consumer. 06 The trial court found that the mobile home
was defective in its workmanship and materials, 0 7 but there
were no findings that these defects made the unit unreasona-
bly dangerous or caused physical damage to the plaintiff or
his property. 08 Noting that, in Texas, a strict liability action
is defined by Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 09 the court based its rejection of the plaintiff's claim
upon the section's requirement that a defective product be
"'unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property". 1 0
In 1978, the Texas Supreme Court, in Mid Continent Air-
craft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Service, Inc.,'" left no
doubt that economic loss occurring when a defect causes dam-
age only to the product itself is not recoverable in Texas." 2 A
rebuilt airplane, sold to the plaintiff by the defendant "as is,"
crashed when the engine failed while the plane was spraying
insecticide on crops."' The crash stemmed from a repairman's
failure to attach a crankshaft gear bolt lock plate when the
engine was overhauled before the sale to the plaintiff."" Sub-
stantial damage was done to the fuselage and wings of the air-
plane; but the pilot suffered no personal injury, and no prop-
105 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
I" Id. at 77-78.
1o7 Id. at 78. Because the mobile home was found to be defective in workmanship
and materials, the court held Nobility Homes liable without regard to privity for the
economic loss to the plaintiff resulting from Nobility's breach of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code's implied warranty of merchantability. Id. at 81.
101 Id. at 78.
I Id. at 79 (citing McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967)).
See supra note 86 for text of Section 402A.
110 557 S.W.2d at 79-80 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
' 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
"' Id. at 313.
113 Id. at 310.
I Id. The airplane was overhauled by Robert Hawkins, a Federal Aviation Admin-
istration licensed engine mechanic who maintained Hawkins Aircraft Shop in
Quanah, Texas. Hawkins was a co-defendant held liable in tort by the trial judge.
Hawkins, however, chose not to appeal. Id. at 309.
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erty other than the aircraft itself was damaged. 115 In refusing
to allow recovery in Mid Continent, the court chose not to
distinguish between a defect that damages only the product
itself but at the same time causes a dangerous condition and a
defect that is not hazardous.11 6 The court noted that the Uni-
form Commercial Code (U.C.C.) was adopted by the Texas
legislature'1 " as a comprehensive codification of the law of
commercial transactions. ' 8 The court reasoned that the con-
templated expansion of strict liability in cases where a defect
harms only the product would frustrate the Code's purpose. '
A dissent in Mid Continent2 0 analyzed the policies underly-
ing tort and contract law and concluded that tort policy
reaches property damage caused by hazardous defects.' 2 ' Con-
cluding that the defective airplane constituted an unreasona-
bly dangerous product within the meaning of section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the dissent, implicitly ap-
plying the "degree of danger" test,'22 would have permitted
tort recovery for the damage to the airplane.'2 -
In an opinion decided the same day as Mid Continent, the
,I8 Id. at 310.
,io Id. at 313. In an earlier decision, Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, dis-
cussed supra at notes 105-10, the court's refusal to allow recovery in strict liability
absent a finding that the product was unreasonably dangerous implied that the court
would follow the "degree of danger" reasoning, if faced with appropriate facts. See
supra notes 62-66.
" TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-9.507 (Vernon 1968).
us 572 S.W.2d at 312.
' Id. at 313. The court stated:
The consumer protection needs upon which strict liability is based are
not sufficiently strong to impose that theory of recovery over the ex-
isting sales law remedies for Curry County's loss in this case. In trans-
actions between a commercial seller and commercial buyer, when no
physical injury has occurred to persons or other property, injury to the
defective product itself is an economic loss governed by the Uniform
Commercial Code.
Id.
12o Id. at 313-20 (Pope, J., dissenting).
121 Id.
' See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
113 572 S.W.2d at 313-20. Justice Pope concluded that the majority decision rejects
the criteria adopted in Nobility Homes, discussed supra at notes 105-10, that find-
ings of a defect and unreasonable danger underlie a products liability case. 572
S.W.2d at 315.
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Supreme Court of Texas further refined its rulings regarding
the recovery of economic loss in strict liability. In Signal Oil
and Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products,12 4 the plaintiff sued in
strict liability to recover for property damage and economic
loss resulting from an explosion and fire at Signal's Houston
refinery, allegedly caused by defects in the manufacture, de-
sign, and installation by the defendant of an isomax reactor
charge heater. 25 The court reiterated that where only the
product itself is damaged, the economic loss is recoverable
only as damages for breach of an implied warranty under the
U.C.C." The court clearly recognized, however, that when a
defect in the product causes collateral harm to other property,
recovery for the product itself is properly considered as part
of the property damage, rather than as economic loss.' 27
Therefore, the plaintiff in Signal Oil, who correctly alleged a
cause of action in strict liability based upon its allegation of
property damage, could recover for the cost of the product
itself.' 8
III CASES IN JURISDICTIONS FOLLOWING Santor
One of the earliest decisions explicitly following the reason-
ing of Santor,19 allowing recovery for economic loss in strict
tort liability, was Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co."' The
plaintiff alleged that golf carts manufactured by the defen-
dant and purchased from a third party were defective'3 ' and
prayed for recovery for loss of his bargain, cost of making re-
pairs, and lost profits. " 2 The Michigan Court of Appeals
quoted approvingly from the text of Santor"' and similarly
reasoned that on principle the manufacturer should be re-
114 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978).
"15 Id. at 322.
:" Id. at 325.
IS? Id.
in Id. Justice Pope concurred in the decision because the defect in the product was
unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 331-33.
S See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
l 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970).
III 182 N.W.2d at 801.
Id. at 801 n.1.
Id. at 804.
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quired to stand behind his defectively manufactured product
and should be held accountable to the end-user even though
the product caused neither accident nor personal injury.1"
In 1975, in Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 135 the Su-
preme Court of Ohio upheld the right to recover economic loss
under a strict liability theory. Plaintiff sued a concrete manu-
facturer whose concrete was used to pour the plaintiff's drive-
way. " 6 The driveway was poured in the spring of 1969 and
that winter "pop-outs"1 3 7 began to form.'" The plaintiff sued
both the manufacturer of the concrete and the contractor who
poured the driveway. " 9 The only damages sought were for the
repair of the driveway." A jury awarded the plaintiff $13,000,
but on appeal the court held that a tortious act had not been
alleged against the manufacturer and reversed the jury verdict
as to the manufacturer. " " In reversing the appellate court, the
Supreme Court of Ohio quoted approvingly from Santor:
From the standpoint of principle we perceive no sound reason
why the implication of reasonable fitness should be attached to
the transaction and be actionable against the manufacturer
where the defectively made product has caused personal injury
and not actionable when inadequate manufacture has put a
worthless article in the hands of an innocent purchaser who
has paid the required price for it.""
While the Ohio Supreme Court labeled the recovery in Iacono
to be for property. damage,4 other courts have consistently
interpreted the decision as allowing the plaintiff compensation
for direct economic loss under a strict liability theory.144
134 Id.
136 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975).
136 326 N.E.2d at 268.
117 "Pop-outs" are small holes. Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 269.
" Id. at 268.
4. Id. at 270-71 (quoting from Santor, 207 A.2d at 309).
1,3 326 N.E.2d at 271.
144 Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355, 366 (N.D. Ohio 1979);
Adcor Realty Corp. v. Mellon-Stuart Co., 450 F. Supp. 769, 770 n.1 (N.D. Ohio 1978);
Continental Oil Co. v. General Am. Transp.,. 409 F. Supp. 288, 296-97 (S.D. Tex.
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In City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Associ-
ates,14 5 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin explicitly followed
the reasoning of Santor when it allowed a plaintiff to recover
repair and replacement costs and lost profits arising from an
allegedly defective roof manufactured by the defendant. '6
Quoting Santor, the Wisconsin court agreed that the princi-
ples of product liability should be applied on the basis of
whether the manufacturer was "the father of the transac-
tion,"" 7 and not on the basis of whether the plaintiff had in-
curred personal injury or simple economic loss. Citing Cova V.
Harley Davidson'" with approval, the court held that a strict
liability claim for pure economic loss involving only the cost
of repair or replacement of the product itself and loss of prof-
its is not demurrable. '
IV. EARLY ILLINOIS CASES
One of the earliest cases in Illinois concerning an action for
economic loss in tort was Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continen-
tal Can Co.'50 The plaintiff therein sued an aerosol can manu-
facturer for damages that resulted from the leakage of cans in
which the plaintiff's product was packaged.15' In reversing the
lower court decision, the appellate court concluded that liabil-
ity could be based on the existence of an implied warranty of
fitness, but held that the plaintiff had no cause of action in
strict tort liability.1 52 The court stated simply, "We are not
persuaded that the doctrine of strict tort liability should be
1976) (applying Ohio law).
"' 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976).
', Id. at 127.
', Id. at 128 (quoting Santor, discussed supra at notes 15-24).
',, 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970), discussed supra at notes 130-34.
City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., 240 N.W.2d at 127. A de-
murrer is an assertion that the complaint does not set forth a cause of action upon
which relief can be granted, and it admits, for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of
the complaint, all properly pleaded facts, but not conclusions of law. Balsbaugh v.
Rowland, 447 Pa. 423, 290 A.2d 85 (1972).
72 I1. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1966).
219 N.E.2d 726.
Id. at 730-32.
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applied here."1 53
More recently, in Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler
Corp.,'54 the intermediate appellate court extensively consid-
ered the justifications underlying the refusal to impose tort
liability on a product manufacturer for the failure of its prod-
uct to perform satisfactorily.'"5 Plaintiff had purchased two
air-conditioning units manufactured by Chrysler.'15 When the
units failed to work correctly, plaintiff brought suit against
Chrysler for the costs of repairing and replacing the units.' 57
In considering whether Illinois tort law provided a basis for
recovery in such a situation, the appellate court asserted that
"this case falls within the narrow range of situations dividing
tort theory from contract theory. This is so because the loss
suffered by the plaintiff in this case was economic loss
.. . ,"58 The court defined economic loss as damages for in-
adequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defec-
tive product, or consequential loss of profits without any claim
of personal injury or damage to other property." 9 The court
chose to follow Rhodes and refused to extend tort theory (neg-
ligence) to permit recovery against a manufacturer for solely
economic losses absent property damage or personal injury
from the use of the product.' c0
Relying on Koplin, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, pre-
dicting Illinois law, refused to allow the recovery of economic
losses under a claim based on tort principles.' e' In Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,' e2 the
plaintiff sued the defendant manufacturer in strict liability
for defects in roofing material which blistered, wrinkled, and
cracked, requiring extensive repairs and eventual replace-
,53 Id. at 730.
I'l 49 Ill. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977).
155 364 N.E.2d 100.
Id. at 101
I d.
, Id. at 103.
M Id. (quoting Note, Economic Loss, supra note 14, at 918).
'° Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 364 N.E.2d at 107.
,61 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d
Cir. 1980). The Illinois Supreme Court had not yet dealt with this issue. Id.
102 Id.
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ment.' 83 The court reasoned that the rationale behind strict
liability in personal injury situations was not well-suited to
claims alleging only economic loss 64 and that the extension of
strict liability in such cases would conflict with the decision
by the Illinois Legislature to enact the sales provisions of the
U.C.C.' In as much as the doctrine of strict liability does not
permit a manufacturer to limit its liability through the use of
a waiver or a limited warranty, 66 the court asserted that im-
portation of strict liability into the economic loss area would
effectively supersede the state's adoption of the U.C.C. 67 Re-
lying on intermediate Illinois appellate court decisions, "
opinions of other courts,'" public policy, and judicial defer-
ence, the court refused to allow recovery for economic loss.
70
A few months later, another Illinois intermediate appellate
court was faced with a similar situation. In Album Graphics,
Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co.,' 7 1 the court of the First District
decided a case in which the plaintiff sued the defendant for
the negligent manufacture of defective glue which caused its
cosmetic packages to fall apart.77 Holding that the plaintiff
failed to state a cause of action in tort to recover purely eco-
nomic losses, the court relied on Koplin's analysis and limited
the plaintiff to recovery under a contract theory. 73
In Fireman's Fund American Insurance Co. v. Burns Elec-
tronic Security Services, Inc., " the First District again re-
fused to allow the recovery of economic loss under a strict lia-
IU Id. at 281-82.
'" Id. at 288-89.
I d. at 289.
l" RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m, § 402B comment d
(1965).
'' 626 F.2d at 289.
Id. (citing Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 194, 364
N.E.2d 100 (1977), Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 72 Ill. App. 2d 362,
219 N.E.2d 726 (1966).
I" E.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965).
170 626 F.2d at 289.
" 87 11. App. 3d 338, 408 N.E.2d 1041 (1980).
I's 408 N.E.2d at 1043.
178 Id. at 1050.
17 93 Ill. App. 3d 298, 417 N.E.2d 131 (1980).
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bility theory. The plaintiff sued for the value of jewelry stolen
when the defendant's burglar alarm system failed to function
properly. 175 Citing Album Graphics and Koplin, the court rea-
soned that if economic loss resulting from negligence is not
recoverable in tort, neither should recovery for loss of the
same character be permitted in strict liability.17 6 In some as-
pects the court differed from Koplin in that it declined to
make the presence or absence of physical harm the determin-
ing factor in a definition of economic oss.177 Rather, the court
stated that economic loss should be contrasted with loss which
the parties could not reasonably be expected to have in mind,
such as "hazards peripheral to what the product's function
is.' ' 7 8 Suggesting that a buyer losing the benefit of his bargain
because the goods are defective should look to his contract for
remedies, the court denied recovery in tort.
17 9
V. MOORMAN MANUFACTURING CO. v. NATIONAL TANK CO.
- THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT'S REASONING
Before reaching its decision in Moorman Manufacturing
Co. v. National Tank Co.,' 80 the Supreme Court of Illinois was
faced with a split in the state appellate court opinions regard-
ing the recovery of economic loss in tort actions. The appel-
late courts of Illinois, beginning with the Rhodes decision in
1966,181 refused to allow a cause of action in strict tort liability
for the recovery of economic losses. The courts in Koplin,8
Album Graphics, s and Fireman's Fund""' reasoned that the
rationale of tort theory was not well-suited to claims alleging
economic loss.
In 1981, however, in its extensive opinion in Moorman,'6 5
"1 417 N.E.2d at 132.
'6 Id. at 133.
177 Id.
178 Id.
'7 Id. at 134.
180 91 I11.2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 433 (1982).
IS, 72 Ill. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1966), discussed supra at notes 150-153.
182 49 Ill. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977), discussed supra at notes 154-60.
153 87 11. App. 3d 338, 408 N.E.2d 1041 (1980)) discussed supra at notes 171-73.
184 93 Ill. App. 3d 298, 417 N.E.2d 131 (1980), discussed supra at notes 174-79.
185 92 I11. App. 136, 414 N.E.2d 1302 (1981).
1983]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the Illinois Fourth District Court of Appeals held that recov-
ery should be allowed for economic loss under the tort theo-
ries of strict liability, misrepresentation and negligence.""
The court stated that "to deny recovery for economic loss be-
cause there is no accompanying personal injury or property
damage is an arbitrary distinction leading to opposite results
in cases that are virtually indistinguishable."' 8 7 The appellate
court refused to follow a rule' 8" which would allow Moorman
to recover the repair cost of the grain storage tank if it alleged
the loss of a mere bushel of corn as a result of the defect, but
which would prohibit recovery in the absence of such property
damage or personal injury."' "A party suffering economic ruin
... should not be denied the protection of the law simply be-
cause he was 'fortunate' enough to escape physical injury."' 90
When a manufacturer has placed a faulty product into the
stream of commerce and the buyer has paid the price de-
manded, the court ruled, the manufacturer should bear the
loss because it is in the best position to spread the cost of that
fault to other buyers or to insure against loss.''
106 Id.
187 414 N.E.2d at 1307.
188 The court noted that Seely required the presence of personal injury or property
damage to state a cause of action in strict liability. Id. at 1306.
188 414 N.E.2d at 1307. The court suggested that if an employee of Moorman had
cut his finger while inspecting the tank, he would have suffered a personal injury
allowing for the recovery of all types of harm, implicitly including the repair cost of
the tank. Id.
190 Id.
1"1 Id. at 1308. The court noted that those jurisdictions denying the plaintiff recov-
ery for economic loss contend that the U.C.C. preempts the field. Id. at 1309. The
court disagreed, reasoning that the U.C.C. was designed for transactions in which the
parties are in roughly equal bargaining positions. Id. at 1310. The court reasoned that
forcing a plaintiff to proceed under the warranty provisions of the U.C.C., rather than
under the doctrine of strict liability in tort, works a considerable hardship on the
plaintiff, who must contend with:
section 2-316 (allowing exclusion or modification of the Code's implied
warranties);
section 2-718 (enforcing reasonable liquidated damages clauses in sales
contracts);
section 2-719 (allowing a seller to limit the buyer's remedy for conse-
quential damages); and
section 2-607 (requiring, as a condition precedent to recovery, that the
buyer give notice of a breach of warranty within a reasonable time af-
ter the breach is discovered or should have been discovered).
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Resolving the conflict in the jurisdictions, the Supreme
Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court in Moorman and
held that recovery for qualitative defects is best handled by
contract law, rather than tort theories.19 2 Beginning its discus-
sion with an analysis of strict liability, the Supreme Court
noted that in its adoption of strict liability in 1965, the court
had emphasized the unreasonably dangerous nature of certain
products by adopting the language of section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts."e' The court in Moorman held
that the language of that section, limiting its application to
unreasonably dangerous defects resulting in physical harm to
the ultimate user or consumer or to his property, reflected
sound policy." 4 The Court noted that: (1) adopting strict lia-
bility in tort for economic loss would effectively eviscerate sec-
tion 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code196 which permits
Id. at 1309. According to the court, the development of the doctrine of strict liability
in tort is evidence of the inadequacies Of the U.C.C. remedies. Id. at 1310.
192 435 N.E.2d at 450.
" Id. at 447. The Illinois Supreme Court adopted strict liability in Suvada v.
White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), in which the brake system in
a reconditioned truck tractor failed, and the truck collided with a bus causing a num-
ber of injuries to the bus passengers and considerable damage to the bus and the
tractor-trailer rig. 210 N.E.2d at 183. In holding the manufacturer of the brake
strictly liable, the court noted that its views on product liability coincided with the
position taken in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A. Id. at 187. See supra note
86 for text of § 402A.
1" 435 N.E.2d at 447.
, U.C.C. § 2-316 provides:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty
and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be con-
strued wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject
to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section
2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such
construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied war-
ranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantablility and in case of a writing must be conspicuous and to
exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must
be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied war-
ranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are
not warranties which extend beyond the description on the face
hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied war-
ranties are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all faults"
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parties to limit warranties in a reasonable manner;0 6 (2) ap-
plying the rules of contract warranty, rather than strict liabil-
ity, prevents a manufacturer from being held liable for dam-
ages of unknown or unlimited scope;19" 7 and (3) bargaining for
a warranty is the purchaser's best protection against the risk
of unsatisfactory performance. 1"a The court reasoned that "it
is preferable to relegate the consumer to the comprehensive
scheme of remedies fashioned by the U.C.C., rather than re-
quiring the consuming public to pay more for their products
so that a manufacturer can insure against the possibility that
some of his products will not meet the business needs of some
of his customers."' 9" The court held that contract law, which
protects the expectation interests of consumers, provides the
proper standard when a product is unfit for its intended
use.
2 0 0
In reaching its decision, the court noted that the characteri-
zation of an injury as "property damage," rather than "eco-
nomic loss," usually depends on the nature of the defect and
the manner in which the damage occurred.20 Quoting from
Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 2 02
the Supreme Court of Illinois expressly agreed with its
rationale:208
or other language which in common understanding calls the
buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain
that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has ex-
amined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired
or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied war-
ranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the
circumstances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by
course of dealing or course of performance or usage or trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with
the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages
and on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719).





*1 Id. at 449.
:0 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981).
03 435 N.E.2d at 450.
CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
[W]here only the defective product is damaged, the majority
approach is to identify whether a particular injury amounts to
economic loss or physical damage. In drawing this distinction,
the items for which damages are sought, such as repair costs,
are not determinative. Rather, the line between tort and con-
tract must be drawn by analyzing interrelated factors such as
the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in
which the injury arose. These factors bear directly on whether
the safety-insurance policy of tort law or the expectation-bar-
gain protection policy of warranty law is most applicable to a
particular claim.2 '
The court concluded that tort theory is appropriately suited
to personal injury or property damage resulting from a sudden
or dangerous occurrence. 205 The remedy for economic loss,
that is, loss relating to a purchaser's disappointed expecta-
tions due to deterioration, internal breakdown or nonacciden-
tal cause, on the other hand, lies in contract.20
With minimal discussion concerning the nature of the de-
fect alleged, the court refused to allow recovery for the repair
of the grain storage tank.20 7 The court held "this was not the
type of sudden and dangerous occurrence best served by the
policy of tort law that the manufacturer should bear the risk
of hazardous products.12 0  The court disposed of the negli-
gence and misrepresentation counts20 9 with a reiteration of its
tort policy considerations.21 0
VI. CONCLUSION
In its decision to refuse recovery in strict liability for a
qualitative defect, the Supreme Court of Illinois in Moorman
appears to have joined the jurisdictions which apply a "degree
of danger" test2 1 ' to distinguish economic loss from property
204 652 F.2d at 1172-73.




09 See supra notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text.
10 435 N.E.2d at 452.
"I See supra notes 65, 66, 74, 100 and accompanying text.
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damage when damage occurs only to the product itself. The
court held that when only the defective product is damaged,
losses caused by qualitative defects relating to the purchaser's
expectations cannot be recovered under a strict liability the-
ory.212 The court's reliance on the Pennsylvania Glass 213 ra-
tional implicitly indicates that damage occurring solely to the
defective product in a "sudden and dangerous"2 1 4 way will be
characterized as property damage and will be allowed in strict
liability actions in Illinois.
The reasoning adopted by the court, which applies the "de-
gree of danger"2 1 5 test and stops short of allowing tort liability
in cases where the product has incurred harm as a result of a
qualitative defect in the product itself, has been criticized as
leaving the consumer unprotected in situations where he suf-
fers enormous pecuniary loss.2 6 Conversely, it has been con-
demned for going too far from contract principles. Dean Kee-
ton observes:
A distinction should be made between the type of dangerous
condition that causes damage only to the product itself and the
type that is dangerous to other property or persons. A hazard-
ous product that has harmed something or someone else can be
labeled as part of the accident problem; tort law seeks to pro-
tect against this type of harm through allocation of risk. In
contrast, a damaging event that harms only the product should
be treated as irrelevant to policy considerations directing lia-
bility placement in tort." '
On the contrary, the court's reasoning in Moorman com-
pletely comports with the notion that the essence of a product
liability case is the plaintiff's exposure, through a hazardous
product, to an unreasonable risk of injury to his person or
"' 435 N.E.2d at 450.
S' 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981).
"' 435 N.E.2d at 450.
"' See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
" 414 N.E.2d at 1307; Comment, Products Liability: Expanding the Property
Damage Exception in Pure Economic Loss Cases, 54 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 968 (1978).
"' Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law, Torts, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 5 (1978) (discussing
Nobility Homes, discussed supra at notes 105-10; and Mid Continent, discussed
supra at notes 111-23).
CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
property. Holding a manufacturer liable for losses incurred
when a product sustains damage to itself caused by a danger-
ous defect clearly furthers the policy of strict tort liability by
enhancing the manufacturer's incentive to produce safe prod-
ucts and by imposing the loss on the one creating the risk of
injury. It does not, however, increase the manufacturer's bur-
den of care because the manufacturer already bears the iden-
tical burden of care under section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts2 1' which subjects a manufacturer to liability
for unreasonably dangerous products.21 9 Furthermore, the rea-
soning of the court does not unduly invade the province of the
U.C.C. which was enacted by the Illinois legislature to govern
economic relations between the suppliers and consumers of
goods in the determination of the quality of a product.20 The
Supreme Court of Illinois, in its decision in Moorman, has
wisely reasoned to protect the consumer from dangerous de-,
fects which fortuitously cause damage only to the product
without imposing an unlimited and uninsurable liability on
the manufacturer for losses caused by the product's failure to
meet the consumer's qualitative expectations.
Rosemary T. Snider
"' See supra note 86 for text of § 402A.
Mid Continent, 572 S.W.2d at 317 (Pope. J., dissenting).
10 Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 447.
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